Black Hat Briefings, USA 2007 [Video] Presentations from the security conference. show

Black Hat Briefings, USA 2007 [Video] Presentations from the security conference.

Summary: Past speeches and talks from the Black Hat Briefings computer security conferences. The Black Hat Briefings USA 2007 was held August 1-3 in Las Vegas at Caesars Palace. Two days, sixteen tracks, over 95 presentations. Three keynote speakers: Richard Clarke, Tony Sager and Bruce Schneier. A post convention wrap up can be found at http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-07/bh-usa-07-index.html Black Hat Briefings bring together a unique mix in security: the best minds from government agencies and global corporations with the underground's most respected hackers. These forums take place regularly in Las Vegas, Washington D.C., Amsterdam, and Tokyo Video, audio and supporting materials from past conferences will be posted here, starting with the newest and working our way back to the oldest with new content added as available! Past speeches and talks from Black Hat in an iPod friendly .mp4 h.264 192k video format. If you want to get a better idea of the presentation materials go to http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-media-archives/bh-archives-2007.html and download them. Put up the pdfs in one window while watching the talks in the other. Almost as good as being there!

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Podcasts:

 Gadi Evron: Estonia: Information Warfare and Strategic Lessons | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 1:13:39

In this talk we will discuss what is now referred to as "The 'first' Internet War" where Estonia was under massive online attacks for a period of three weeks, following tensions with the local Russian population. Following a riot in the streets of Tallinn, an online assault begun, resulting in a large-scale coordination of the Estonian defenses on both the local and International levels. We will demonstrate what in hind-sight worked for both the attackers and the defenders, as well as what failed. Following the chronological events and technical information, we will explore what impact these attacks had on Estonia's civil infrastructure and daily life, and how they impacted its economy during the attacks. Once we cover that ground, we will evaluate what we have so far discussed and elaborate on lessons learned while Gadi was in Estonia and from the post-mortem he wrote for the Estonian CERT. We will conclude our session by recognizing case studies on the strategic level, which can be deducted from the incident and studied in preparation for future engagements in cyber-space. Gadi Evron works for the Mclean, VA based vulnerability assessment solution vendor Beyond Security as Security Evangelist and is the chief editor of the security portal SecuriTeam. He is a known leader in the world of Internet security operations, and especially in the realm of botnets and phishing as well as is the operations manager for the Zeroday Emergency Response Team (ZERT). He is a known expert on corporate security and espionage threats. Previously Gadi was the Israeli Government Internet Security Operations Manager (CISO) and the Israeli Government CERT Manager which he founded.

 HD Moore & Valsmith: Tactical Exploitation-Part 2 | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 1:12:12

Penetration testing often focuses on individual vulnerabilities and services. This talk introduces a tactical approach that does not rely on exploiting known vulnerabilities. Using combination of new tools and obscure techniques, I will walk through the process of compromising an organization without the use of normal exploit code. Many of the tools will be made available as new modules for the Metasploit Framework. REVIEWER NOTES: This is a monstrous presentation and will absolutely require the 150-minute time slot. For a smaller version of this presentation, please see my other submission (System Cracking with Metasploit 3). The goal of this presentation is to show some of the non-standard ways of breaking into networks, methods that are often ignored by professional pen-testing teams.

 Richard A. Clarke: KEYNOTE: A Story About Digital Security in 2017 | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 44:50

To those who seek truth through science, even when the powerful try to suppress it. Richard A. Clarke is a former U.S. government official who specialized in intelligence, cyber security and counter-terrorism. Until his retirement in January 2003, Mr. Clarke was a member of the Senior Executive Service. He served as an advisor to four U.S. presidents from 1973 to 2003: Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Most notably, Clarke was the chief counter-terrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security Council for both the latter part of the Clinton Administration and early part of the George W. Bush Administration through the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Clarke came to widespread public attention for his role as counter-terrorism czar in the Clinton and Bush Administrations when in March of 2004 he appeared on the 60 Minutes television news magazine, his memoir about his service in government, Against All Enemies was released, and he testified before the 9/11 Commission. In all three instances, Clarke was sharply critical of the Bush Administration's attitude toward counter-terrorism before the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the decision to go to war with Iraq. Richard Clarke is currently Chairman of Good Harbor Consulting, a strategic planning and corporate risk management firm, an on-air consultant for ABC News, and a contributor to GoodHarborReport.com, an online community discussing homeland security, defense, and politics. He also recently published his first novel, The Scorpion's Gate, in 2005; and a second, Breakpoint, in 2007.

 Tony Sager: KEYNOTE: The NSA Information Assurance Directorate and the National Security Community | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 46:15

The Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) within the National Security Agency (NSA) is charged in part with providing security guidance to the national security community. Within the IAD, the Vulnerability Analysis and Operations (VAO) Group identifies and analyzes vulnerabilities found in the technology, information, and operations of the Department of Defense (DoD) and our other federal customers. This presentation will highlight some of the ways that the VAO Group is translating vulnerability knowledge in cooperation with many partners, into countermeasures and solutions that scale across the entire community. This includes the development and release of security guidance through the NSA public website (www.nsa.gov) and sponsorship of a number of community events like the Cyber Defense Initiative and the Red Blue Symposium. It also includes support for, or development of, open standards for vulnerability information (like CVE, the standard naming scheme for vulnerabilities); the creation of the extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) to automate the implementation and measurement of security guidance; and joint sponsorship, with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), of the Information Security Automation Program (ISAP), to help security professionals automate security compliance and manage vulnerabilities. The presentation will also discuss the cultural shift we have been making to treat network security as a community problem, one that requires large -scale openness and cooperation with security stakeholders at all points in the security supply chainoperators, suppliers, buyers, authorities and practitioners. Tony Sager is the Chief of the Vulnerability Analysis and Operations (VAO) Group, part of the Information Assurance Directorate at the National Security Agency. The mission of the VAO organization is to identify, characterize, and put into operational context vulnerabilities found in the technology, information, and operations of the DoD and the national security community and to help the community identify countermeasures and solutions. This group is known for its work developing and releasing security configuration guides to provide customers with the best options for securing widely used products. The VAO Group also helps to shape the development of security standards for vulnerability naming and identification, such as the Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL), partnering with National Institute for Standards and technology (NIST) on the Information Security Automation Program (ISAP), developing the eXtensible configuration checklist description format (XCCDF), and for hosting the annual Cyber Defense Exercise and the Red Blue Symposium. Mr. Sager is active in the public network security community, as a member of the CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) Senior Advisory Council and the Strategic Advisory Council for The Center for Internet Security. He is in his 29th year with the National Security Agency, all of which he has spent in the computer and network security field.

 Bruce Schneier: KEYNOTE: The Psychology of Security | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 49:21

Security is both a feeling and a reality. You can feel secure without actually being secure, and you can be secure even though you don't feel secure. In the industry, we tend to discount the feeling in favor of the reality, but the difference between the two is important. It explains why we have so much security theater that doesn't work, and why so many smart security solutions go unimplemented. Two different fieldsbehavioral economics and the psychology of decision makingshed light on how we perceive security, risk, and cost. Learn how perception of risk matters and, perhaps more importantly, learn how to design security systems that will actually get used. Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist and CTO of BT Counterpane, referred to by The Economist as a "security guru." He is the author of eight booksincluding the best sellers "Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World," "Secrets and Lies," and "Applied Cryptography"and hundreds of articles and academic papers. His influential newsletter, Crypto-Gram, and blog "Schneier on Security," are read by over 250,000 people. He is a prolific writer and lecturer, a frequent guest on television and radio, has testified before Congress, and is regularly quoted in the press on issues surrounding security and privacy.

 Jonathan Afek: Dangling Pointer | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 1:06:58

A Dangling Pointer is a well known security flaw in many applications. When a developer writes an application, he/she usually uses pointers to many data objects. In some scenarios, the developer may accidentally use a pointer to an invalid object. In such a case, the application will enter an unintended execution flow which could lead to an application crash or other types of dangerous behaviors.

 Pedram Amini & Aaron Portnoy: Fuzzing Sucks! (or Fuzz it Like you Mean it!) | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 1:13:03

Face it, fuzzing sucks. Even the most expensive commercial fuzzing suites leave much to be desired by way of automation. Perhaps the reason for this is that even the most rudimentary fuzzers are surprisingly effective. None the less, if you are serious about fuzz testing in as much a scientific process as possible than you have no doubt been disappointed with the current state of affairs. Until now. This talk is about Sulley. An open source, freely available, full featured and extensible fuzzing framework being released at Black Hat US 2007. Modern day fuzzers are, for the most part, solely focused on data generation. Sulley does this better and more. Sulley watches the network and methodically maintains records. Sulley instruments and monitors the health of the target, capable of reverting to a good state using multiple methods. Sulley detects, tracks and categorizes detected faults. Sulley can fuzz in parallel, significantly increasing test speed. Sulley can automatically determine what unique sequence of test cases trigger faults. Sulley does all this, and more, automatically and without attendance.

 Brandon Baker: Kick Ass Hypervisoring: Windows Server Virtualization | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 59:03

Virtualization is changing how operating systems function and how enterprises manage data centers. Windows Server Virtualization, a component of Windows Server 2008, will introduce new virtualization capabilities to the Windows operating system. This talk will focus on security model of the system, with emphasis on design choices and deployment considerations. Aspects of virtualization security related to hardware functions will also be explored.

 Andrea Barisani & Daniele Bianco: Injecting RDS-TMC Traffic Information Signals a.k.a. How to freak out your Satellite Navigation. | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 1:06:47

RDS-TMC is a standard based on RDS (Radio Data System) for communicating over FM radio Traffic Information for Satellite Navigation Systems. All modern in-car Satellite Navigation systems sold in Europe use RDS-TMC to receive broadcasts containing up to date information about traffic conditions such as queues and accidents and provide detours in case they affect the plotted course. The system is increasingly being used around Europe and North America. The audience will be introduced to RDS/RDS-TMC concepts and protocols and we'll show how to decode/encode such messages using a standard PC and cheap home-made electronics, with the intent of injecting information in the broadcast RDS-TMC stream manipulating the information displayed by the satellite navigator. We'll discover the obscure (but scary!) messages that can be broadcast (and that are not usually seen over legitimate RDS-TMC traffic), the limits of standard SatNav systems when flooded with unusual messages and the role that RDS-TMC injection / jamming can play in social engineering attempts (hitmen in the audience will love this!). In order to maximize the presentation we'll also demo the injection...hopefully at low power so that we won't piss off local radio broadcasts.

 Rohyt Belani & Keith Jones: Smoke 'em Out! | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 1:20:42

Tracing a malicious insider is hard; proving their guilt even harder. In this talk, we will discuss the challenges faced by digital investigators in solving electronic crime committed by knowledgeable insiders. These challenges will be presented in light of three real world investigations conducted by the presenters. The focus of this talk will on the technicalities of the attacks, the motivation of the attackers, and the response techniques used by the investigators to solve the respective crimes. The first case is the high-profile U.S. v Duronio trial, in which Keith Jones testified as the DoJ?s computer forensics expert. Mr. Jones testified for over five days about how Mr. Duronio, a disgruntled employee, planted a logic bomb within UBS?s network to render critical trading servers unusable. His testimony was key in the prosecution of the accused on charges of securities fraud and electronic crime. Mr. Jones will present the information as he did to the jury during this trial. The second incident involved a recently fired employee at a large retail organization. The irked employee made his way from a store wireless network into the company's core credit card processing systems. The purpose of the attack was to malign the company?s image by releasing the stolen data on the Internet. We will discuss the anatomy of the "hack", the vulnerabilities exploited along the way, and our sleepless nights in Miami honing in on the attacker. The final case presented will focus on the technicalities of web browser forensics and how it facilitated the uncovering of critical electronic evidence that incriminated a wrong-doer, and more importantly freed an innocent systems administrator at a law firm from being terminated and facing legal music. The common thread in all these cases - a malicious insider!

 Yoriy Bolygin: Remote and Local Exploitation of Network Drivers | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 1:14:40

During 2006 vulnerabilities in wireless LAN drivers gained an increasing attention in security community. One can explain this by the fact that any hacker can take control over every vulnerable laptop of entire enterprise without any "visible" connection with those laptops and execute a malicious code in kernel. This work describes the process behind hunting remote and local vulnerabilities in wireless LAN drivers as well as in other types of network drivers. The first part of the work describes simple and much more advanced examples of remote execution vulnerabilities in wireless device drivers that should be considered during quest for vulnerabilities. We demonstrate an example design of kernel-mode payload on Windows and construct a simple wireless frames fuzzer. The second part of the work explains local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in I/O Control device driver interface on Windows, introduces a technique to uncover them and IOCTLBO fuzzer implementing this technique. Third part of the work describes specific examples of local vulnerabilities in network drivers that can be exploited remotely and introduces an exploitation technique. In the last part of the work we present case studies of remote and local vulnerabilities mitigated in Intel Centrino wireless LAN drivers. The work concludes discussing vulnerabilities in other types of network drivers.

 Damiano Bolzoni & Emmanuel Zambon: Sphinx: an anomaly-based Web Intrusion Detection System | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 1:03:39

We present Sphinx, a new fully anomaly-based Web Intrusion Detection Systems (WIDS). Sphinx has been implemented as an Apache module (like ModSecurity, the most deployed Web Application Firewall), therefore can deal with SSL and POST data. Our system uses different techniques at the same time to improve detection and false positive rates. Being anomaly-based, Sphinx needs a training phase before the real detection could start: during the training, Sphinx ?learns? automatically the type of each parameter inside user requests and applies the most suitable model to detect attacks. We define 3 basic types: numerical, short and long texts. The idea behind this is that, e.g., if we observe only integer values and later some text, that is likely to be an attack (e.g. SQL Injection or XSS). For numerical parameters, a type checker is applied. For short texts (text with fixed length or slight variations), Sphinx uses a grammar checker: grammars are built observing the parameter content (during the training phase) and then used to check the similarity of new content during detection. Long texts are typically e-mail/forum messages, which change often their length and would produce infeasible grammars. For this kind of content we use a modified version of our NIDS POSEIDON, using n-gram analysis. Furthermore, Sphinx can actively support the deployment of WAFs like ModSecurity: e.g. if we are deploying an ad hoc web application, most probably we need to spend a lot of time on writing signatures (or when 3rd parties? software is used). Once Sphinx accomplishes the training phase, it can automatically generates ModSecurity-style signatures for numerical and (some) short-text parameters, making the deployment much easier.

 Jamie Butler & Kris Kendall: Blackout: What Really Happened... | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 1:10:25

Malicious software authors use code injection techniques to avoid detection, bypass host-level security controls, thwart the efforts of human analysts, and make traditional memory forensics ineffective. Often a forensic examiner or incident response analyst may not know the weaknesses of the tools they are using or the advantage the attacker has over those tools by hiding in certain locations. This session provides a detailed exploration of code injection attacks and novel countermeasures, including: 1. The technical details of code injection starting with basic user land techniques and continuing through to the most advanced kernel injection techniques faced today. 2. Case study of captured malware that reveals how these techniques are used in real world situations. 3. Discussion of current memory forensic strengths and weaknesses. 4. New memory forensic analysis techniques for determining if a potential victim machine has been infected via code injection. 5. Post acquisition analysis.

 David Byrne: Intranet Invasion With Anti-DNS Pinning | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 53:54

Cross Site Scripting has received much attention over the last several years, although some of its more ominous implications have not received much attention. Anti-DNS pinning is a relatively new threat that, while not well understood by most security professionals, is far from theoretical. This presentation will focus on a live demonstration of anti-DNS pinning techniques. A victim web browser will be used to execute arbitrary, interactive HTTP requests to any server, completely bypassing perimeter firewalls. This is NOT a Jickto knockoff. Jickto relies on using a proxy or caching site like Google to place both sites in the same domain. This does not allow for full interaction with dynamic pages, or any interaction with internal web sites. This demonstration allows full interaction with arbitrary web servers in the intranet environment. No browser bugs or plug-ins are required to accomplish this, only JavaScript. The presenter will demonstrate an automated attack process that provides an HTTP proxy service for the attacker?s browser after scanning the internal network for web servers. New requests are retrieved from the attack server by using the width and height of truncated images (only 66 bytes) as a covert channel.*** This bypasses the browser DOM normal behavior of allowing data to be requested only from the server that provided the HTML. Before demonstrating the tool, anti-DNS pinning will be explained in a way that anyone familiar with the basics of DNS and HTTP will understand. The presenter will describe the presentation environment and attack components, then walk through the steps in an attack. Once the foundation concepts have been established, the live demonstration will be performed. Towards the end, the presentation will also briefly cover suggested defenses, including changing pinning behavior in browsers, better intranet security, gateway behavioral scanners, increased granularity for IE security zones, and introduction of security zones into Mozilla and other browsers.

 Stephan Chenette & Moti Joseph: Defeating Web Browser Heap Spray Attacks | File Type: video/mp4 | Duration: 35:27

In 2007 black hat Europe a talk was given titled: "Heap Feng Shui in JavaScript" That presentation introduced a new technique for precise manipulation of the browser heap layout using specific sequences of JavaScript allocations. This allowed an attacker to set up the heap in any desired state and exploit difficult heap corruption vulnerabilities with more reliability and precision. Our talk is a defensive response to this new technique. We will begin with an overview of "in the wild" heap spray exploits and how we can catch them, as well other zero day exploits using our exploit-detection module. We will give an overview of the analysis engine we have built that utilizes this module and we will demonstrate scanning and detection of a "live" website hosting a heap corruption vulnerability. The talk will focus on Internet Explorer exploitation, but the general technique presented is applicable to other browsers as well.

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